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Executive Summary
Global production of genetically modified (GM) 
agricultural commodities has increased significantly 
in the past decade. Some people see GM crops as 
offering new hope in addressing some of the most 
serious problems that poor people in developing 
countries face, such as hunger and malnutrition. 
Others see them as creating unpredictable health 
and environmental problems and having negative 
economic repercussions.
The proliferation of domestic biosafety measures 
has increasingly affected international trade in GM 
products and led to trade disputes. Although WTO 
member countries can make their own decisions 
regarding GM products at the national level, 
domestic legislation must be WTO-consistent to 
the extent of not adversely affecting international 
trade. In this respect, other legal documents, nota­
bly the multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), also play a role. The Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety is the MEA that deals with trans­
boundary movement of GM products. The inter­
action between the Protocol and the WTO rules 
adds challenges to an already complex scenario of 
international trade.
A number of conflicts exist between the Protocol 
and the WTO rules. These conflicts boil down to 
the fundamental issue of which rules should prevail 
when trade disputes related to GM products arise. 
This issue lies at the heart of the perceived conflict 
between trade liberalization and environmental pro­
tection and was heatedly debated among different 
interest groups during the negotiation of the 
Protocol.
The “Miami Group," representing major agricul­
tural exporters including the United States, holds 
the view that the WTO agreements are the only 
law applicable in resolving trade disputes over GM 
products. They fear that non-WTO agreements 
[such as the Protocol] may give an importing coun­
try excuses to limit trade in GM products. Poten­
tial loopholes in the Protocol could also allow a 
country to favor domestic GM production over 
imports, or GM product imports from some coun­
tries over others. The Miami Group thus favors the 
inclusion in the Protocol of a "savings clause," 
which could, in effect, save provisions of the WTO
agreements from being overcome by those of the 
Protocol.
The European Union [EU] and most developing 
countries, on the other hand, argue that the Proto­
col should be invoked in defense against WTO 
claims. They support a comprehensive Protocol in 
light of the unknown effects of GM products on 
the environment and human health. Because food 
scandals in recent years have deeply shaken con­
sumer trust in food safety, the EU in particular 
calls for a strong statement of the precautionary 
principle as provided in the Protocol.
To resolve its potential conflicts with the WTO 
provisions, the Protocol contains a "savings clause," 
which recognizes the importance of existing inter­
national agreements. Meanwhile, it calls for the 
mutually supportive functioning of trade and envi­
ronmental agreements with a view to achieving sus­
tainable development. The Protocol also provides 
different procedures and documentation require­
ments in dealing with different types of living 
modified organisms [LMOs],
Your assignment is to recommend changes in 
either the Protocol or the WTO agreements that 
would mitigate the conflicts between GM com­
modity trade and environmental protection, taking 
into account the positions of the key stakeholder 
groups.
Background
Biotechnology and GM Crops
Modern biotechnology has enabled human beings 
to change the characteristics of living organisms 
through in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including 
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] and 
direct injection of nucleic acid into cells, and 
through transfer of genetic information from one 
organism, across species boundaries, into another 
organism. Compared with conventional methods of 
plant and livestock selection and improvement, 
modern biotechnology can identify desirable traits 
more quickly and accurately and allows gene trans­
fers beyond the taxonomic family, a process that is 
impossible with traditional breeding. The appiica-
tion of modern biotechnology in sectors such as 
agriculture and medicine has led to the creation of 
genetically modified organisms [GMOs] and 
products derived from them.
Recent advances in biotechnology have significantly 
enhanced global production of GM agricultural 
commodities [Figure 1]. In 2006  the estimated 
global GM crop area was more than 100 million 
hectares, distributed among 22 countries and culti­
vated by approximately 10.3 million farmers. The 
United States is by far the largest GM commodity 
producer by area, with 54.6 million hectares 
planted in 2006 [Table 1], Industrial countries that 
are major agricultural exporters, like Australia and 
Canada, as well as many developing countries have 
also adopted these technologies. Altogether, devel­
oping countries account for more than one-third 
of total world GM crop area. The largest GM 
crop-producing developing country is Argentina, 
with a crop area of 18 million hectares in 2006.
Other developing countries, including Brazil, China, 
India, and Paraguay, have significantly expanded 
their crop area in recent years. In these countries, 
maize, soybeans, and cotton have been the major 
GM crops to date, with active research on other 
crops under way.
Biotechnological improvements and increases in 
GM crop production present significant oppor­
tunities for developing countries. At present, the 
perceived benefits of GM crops originate from 
their input traits, such as better weed and insect 
control, higher productivity, and more flexible 
crop management. Thus, the so-called first-genera­
tion GM crops benefit mainly farmers, who can 
obtain higher yields, lower costs, or both. For 
them, the estimated economic gains amounted to 
US$5.6 billion in 2005 according to  a recent 
survey [James 2006]. Consumers can also benefit 
from this generation of GM crops primarily 
through lowered food prices.
Figure /: Global Area of Biotech Crops, 1995-2006 (million hectares)
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Source: James 2006.
Table 1: Area Planted to  Biotech Crops, b y  C ountry, 2 0 0 6
A r e a
R ank C o n  n tr y (m ill io n  h e c ta r e s ) B io tech  C r o p s
1 United States 54.6 Soybean, maize, cotton, canola, squash, papaya, alfalfa
2 Argentina 18.0 Soybean, maize, cotton
3 Brazil 11.5 Soybean, cotton
4 Canada 6.1 Canola, maize, soybean
5 India 3.8 Cotton
6 China 3.5 Cotton
7 Paraguay 2.0 Soybean
8 South Africa 1.4 Maize, soybean, cotton
9 Uruguay 0.4 Soybean, maize
10 Philippines 0.2 Maize
II Australia 0.2 Cotton
12 Romania 0.1 Soybean
13 Mexico 0.1 Cotton, soybean
14 Spain 0.1 Maize
Note: Table lists the largest 14 countries with growing area greater than 50,000 hectares. 
Source: James 2006.
The newly developed second-generation GM crops 
with applications for output traits [such as vitamin 
A in golden rice) are expected to benefit con­
sumers even more. A number of GM products are 
being developed to provide edible vaccines and 
micronutrients so that they can be delivered to the 
poor in a more affordable way [Mackenzie and 
McLean 2004). In addition, expansion in inter­
national trade in GM crops can lead to significant 
welfare gains for developing countries [Anderson 
and Nielsen 2000). In general, GM crops offer the 
developing world hope for better food security and 
better health and nutrition.
Modern biotechnologies and the resulting products 
have not, however, come without doubt and con­
troversy. There are many fears linked to perceived 
threats of biotechnology to human, animal, and 
plant life and health, to the conservation of bio­
diversity, and to the environment at large. For 
example, some researchers have raised concerns
that genetic modifications might produce foods 
that contain toxins, trigger allergies, or lead to 
antibiotic resistance. Others have asserted that GM 
crops can adversely affect poor economies because 
they might disrupt small-scale farming systems and 
encourage monoculture or create a monopolistic 
market structure in which foreign biotechnology 
companies can limit poor farmers' access to seeds. 
Still others have raised ethical and religious con­
cerns that these technologies enable human beings 
to play God. Perhaps the most serious concerns are 
those related to the environmental impacts of 
transgenic plants, which may transmit their genes 
to other crops or wild plants through pollen dis­
persal or may evolve into invasive species as their 
superior traits allow them to out compete other 
plants. Although there is not yet any definite scien­
tific evidence of harm from GM products to
humans, animals, or the environment, many agree 
that more extensive research may reveal such risks.1
A surge of public concern about GM products has 
swept from the EU to Asia since the late 1990s, 
and consumers and environmental groups have 
insisted on stronger government controls on bio­
technology and products created from it. Coun­
tries' regulatory approaches, however, differ dras­
tically depending on factors such as their policy 
awareness, the level of risk they perceive and are 
willing to accept, their capacity to carry out risk 
assessments and implement adequate legislation, 
their perception of the benefits of biotechnology, 
their concerns about traditional nonbiotechnology 
industries, their dependence on agricultural 
exports, their reliance on food aid, and the invest­
ments they have already made in the sector [Zarrilli 
2005], National legislation on biotechnology and 
GM products ranges from "limited regulation" in 
many developing countries [addressing certain 
aspects of biosafety), to "specific regulation" in the 
EU [involving pre-marketing approval and manda­
tory labeling regimes for GM products), to "exist­
ing regulation" in the United States [simply apply­
ing the instruments developed for conventional 
foods) [Eggers and Mackenzie 2000).
The Cartagena Protocol
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety [hereinafter, 
the Protocol) adopted on January 29, 2000, is the 
first binding international agreement dealing with 
modern biotechnology and GM products.2 It was 
negotiated under the auspices of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and specifically focused on 
the transboundary movement of GM products, 
referred to in the Protocol as "living modified 
organisms" [LMOs). The LMOs include "all living 
modified organisms that may have adverse effects
1 A  few studies, like the one on the monarch butterfly, 
suggest possible negative impacts of G M  products on 
the environment, but again these findings are 
controversial.
2 The Cartagena Protocol is a protocol of the
Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD), Article 19.3 of 
which provides for parties to consider the need for and 
modalities of a protocol on the safe transfer, handling, 
and use of LM O s that may have an adverse effect on 
biodiversity. Negotiation of the Protocol started in 1996 
in Aarhus, Denmark, and the draft was completed in 1999 
in Cartagena de indias, Colombia. The final text was 
adopted in Montreal, Canada, in 2000  (see Schweizer 
2000  for an overview of the negotiation process).
on the conservation and sustainable use of biologi­
cal diversity, taking also into account risks to 
human health" [Article 4).
The Protocol distinguishes two major categories of 
LMOs: LMOs for voluntary introduction into the 
environment, such as seeds for planting, live fish 
for release, and microorganisms for bioremediation; 
and LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed 
or for processing [LMO-FFPs).3 The latter category 
contains the large majority of LMOs, including 
genetically modified crops like soybeans, maize, 
canola, and cotton. The Protocol does not cover 
consumer products derived from LMOs, such as 
corn flakes, flour, and seed oil [Article 3) or 
pharmaceuticals addressed by other relevant inter­
national agreements or organizations [Article 5).
The Protocol defines two major sets of procedures 
for safely moving LMOs across borders: an 
Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure for 
LMOs that are to be intentionally introduced into 
the environment [Article 7), and a simplified pro­
cedure for LMOs that are intended to be used 
directly as food or feed or for processing [Article 
11). Parties to the Protocol must ensure that LMOs 
are handled, packaged, and transported under safe 
conditions. Furthermore, LMOs moving across 
boundaries must be accompanied by documenta­
tion specifying, among other things, the identity of 
the LMOs and a contact point for further informa­
tion. These requirements are designed to provide 
importing parties with the information needed to 
make informed decisions about whether or not to 
accept LMO imports and how to handle them in a 
safe manner.
The Protocol stipulates that the importing country 
must make its decisions in accordance with scien­
tifically sound risk assessments [Article 15). In its 
annex, the Protocol sets out principles and 
methodologies on how to conduct a risk assess­
ment. In case of insufficient relevant scientific 
information and knowledge, the party of import 
may use precaution in making its decisions about 
importing [Article I and 10). Parties may also take 
into account, consistent with their international 
obligations, socioeconomic considerations in 
reaching decisions on import of LMOs (Article 26).
3 The Protocol also defines LM O s in transit and for 
contained use but does not specify particular procedures 
for handling them (Article 6).
Parties must also adopt measures for managing any 
risks identified by the risk assessment, and they 
must take necessary steps in the event of accidental 
release of LMOs [Article 16]. To facilitate its 
implementation, the Protocol establishes a Biosafety 
Clearing-House for Parties to exchange information 
and contains provisions for capacity building, a 
financial mechanism, compliance procedures, and 
requirements for public awareness and participa­
tion.
Relevant WTO Rules
The Protocol is not the only international law that 
deals with transboundary movement of GM 
products. Two WTO agreements—the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures [SPS Agreement] and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade [TBT Agreement]—are 
also relevant to the trade in LMOs defined in the 
Protocol. The SPS Agreement, with its purpose of 
protecting human, animal and plant life and health, 
applies to all the sanitary and phytosanitary meas­
ures that may directly or indirectly affect interna­
tional trade [Article 1], Restrictions on the trade in 
LMOs in the SPS Agreement include those related 
to product quarantine, testing, packaging and 
labeling. The TBT Agreement applies a similar set 
of technical barriers to the import of LMOs, but 
with purposes other than environmental or human 
health protection. Rather, these barriers are 
imposed to inform consumer or to protect a state's 
culture or economy.
Pursuant to the SPS Agreement, a member has a 
right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal, and plant life or health, and the measures 
should be based on scientific principles and should 
not be maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence [Article 2], The SPS Agreement also pro­
hibits discrimination, so that SPS measures may not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
members where identical or similar conditions 
prevail and may not be applied in a manner that 
would constitute a disguised restriction on interna­
tional trade (Article 2], Similarly, the TBT Agree­
ment stipulates that WTO members may not to 
discriminate against imports through their technical 
regulations and standards, and technical regulations 
may not be more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfill a legitimate objective (Article 2],
The SPS Agreement includes a precautionary clause 
stating that in cases where relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient, a member may "provi­
sionally" adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
on the basis of available pertinent information 
(Article 5], In such circumstances, however, a 
member has a continuing obligation both to obtain 
the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and to review the sani­
tary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time.
A Recent GMO Case
In May 2003 Argentina, Canada, and the United 
States initiated a complaint before the WTO against 
the EU's restrictive measures on approval and 
marketing of biotech products [WT/DS29I, 
WT/DS292, and WT/DS293], Regarding EU-Ievel 
measures, the complainants asserted that the mora­
torium (both general and product-specific] applied 
by the EU since October 1998 on the approval of 
biotech products had restricted their exports of 
agricultural and food products. The complainants 
also asserted that a number of individual EU mem­
ber states maintained national marketing and 
import bans on biotech products even though 
those products had already been approved by the 
EU for import and marketing. The EU moratorium 
was subsequently lifted, but owing to consumer 
rejection, the EU food market has remained closed 
to genetically modified organisms [GMOs], and 
several member states have kept their national bans 
in place.
The final ruling issued on September 29, 2006, 
concluded that general and product-specific mora- 
toria had led to an "undue delay" in the completion 
of the EU's approval procedures for biotech 
products, thus breaching the EU's obligations 
under the WTO's SPS Agreement [WT/DS29I/R, 
WT/DS292/R, and WT/DS293/R], The panel 
requested the EU to bring the moratoria in line 
with the provisions of the SPS Agreement "if, and 
to the extent that" these measures have "not 
already ceased to exist." The panel also rejected the 
EU's defense of the national-level bans as pre­
cautionary measures, arguing that sufficient scien­
tific evidence was in fact available to carry out an
adequate risk assessment.4 The panel report called 
on the EU to bring the measures in conformity 
with WTO rules. This conformity would imply 
revoking the national-level bans or providing an SPS 
Agreement-compliant risk assessment justifying 
the measures.
Farmers' groups and biotechnology industries in 
the three complainant countries welcomed the 
panel's ruling. They described it as trade facilitating 
and favoring science-based policy-making over the 
unjustified, anti-biotech policies. The EU appeared 
indifferent about the ruling, suggesting that it 
would have few implications for its current rules 
and procedures since the moratoria in the EU had 
already been lifted before the ruling. Several civil 
society groups, including Friends of the Earth 
Europe [FOEE], the Institute for Agricultural Trade 
Policy [IATP], and Greenpeace, sharply criticized 
the panel's decision for undermining international 
environmental law and the precautionary principles.
These groups were also concerned that the WTO 
dispute settlement process was biased towards the 
will of powerful members. In the GMO case, the 
panel refused to take into account the Cartagena 
Protocol or the Convention on Biological Diversity 
because the parties to the dispute were not also 
parties to the agreements.5 Yet, in the famous 
"shrimp-turtle" case [WT/DS58/AB/R], the panel 
did refer to international environmental agreements 
that the United States had not signed in support of 
the U.S. argument for restricting its shrimp trade.6 *
Following the GMO case ruling, many environ­
mentalists concluded that the WTO should no 
longer be the appropriate institution to deal with
4 Article S.7 of the SPS Agreement only permits W TO  
members to "provisionally" adopt SPS measures in the 
absence of sufficient evidence.
5 The United States is not a party to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity or the Protocol. Argentina and 
Canada are parties to the Convention but not to the 
Protocol.
6 Despite the quotation of international environmental 
laws for defending its trade measures, the United States 
still lost the case because it failed to apply the most- 
favored nation [MFN] principle. The United States
provided countries in the Western Hemisphere— mainly 
in the Caribbean— with technical and financial assistance 
and longer transition periods for their fishers to start 
using turtle-excluder devices [TEDs], it did not, however, 
give the same advantages to the four Southeast Asian 
countries (India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand] that 
filed the complaint with the WTO.
environment-related trade issues and that the inter­
national community should find an alternative 
mechanism for dispute settlement before another 
case occurs [Greenpeace 2006]
Policy Issues
Potential Conflicts between the Protocol 
and WTO Rules
There are two major potential sources of conflicts 
between the Protocol and the WTO rules [Safrin 
2002], First, both the Protocol and the relevant 
WTO agreements contain "precautionary language" 
that allows a party to impose import bans or other 
restrictions on LMOs when there is a lack of scien­
tific certainty about the extent of their potential 
adverse effects [that is, when proper risk assess­
ment is not possible]. Unlike the WTO Agree­
ments, however, the Protocol does not require that 
precautionary measures be adopted "provisionally." 
In other words, the Protocol does not expressly 
require a party that takes precautionary measures 
in the face of scientific uncertainty to seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a 
more objective assessment of risk and to review 
those measures within a reasonable period of time, 
as required by Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. 
Rather, the Protocol only requires that the pre­
cautionary measures be taken "as appropriate" 
[Article 10] and that a review be conducted only at 
the request of the party of export [Article 12], The 
wording in the Protocol tends to give a country 
attempting to avoid its WTO obligations ample 
room to argue for the legitimacy of its restrictive 
trade measures on LMOs.
Second, the Protocol contains a number of discre­
tionary provisions that permit a party to take dis­
criminatory actions that could violate the party's 
WTO obligations. For example, Articles 10 and 11 
of the Protocol provide that a party of import shall 
make a decision on the import of different LMOs 
but does not compel a particular decisional out­
come. In addition, parties can proceed according to 
their own domestic regulatory framework [Article 
9] or adopt simplified procedures [Article 13] as 
long as these are consistent with the objectives of 
the Protocol. Moreover, Article 14 of the Protocol 
permits parties to enter into bilateral and multi­
lateral agreements that would govern the trade in 
covered LMOs, in lieu of the Protocol itself, 
"provided that such agreements and arrangements
do not result in a lower level of protection than 
provided for by the Protocol." If a party to both 
the Protocol and the WTO agreements allows the 
import of a given LMO from one WTO member 
but not from another, permits the domestic 
production but not the import of a given LMO, or 
enters into a regional agreement exempting imports 
of LMOs from countries in that region from regu­
latory scrutiny, while it continued to subject the 
import of like LMOs from other countries to 
regulatory review, its action would be allowed by 
the Protocol but would clearly violate the WTO 
agreements.
Protocol or WTO Agreements?
Given the potential conflicts between the Protocol 
and WTO rules, one fundamental question is how 
to deal with the relationship between the two: when 
trade disputes on GM products arise, should the 
requirements of the Protocol or those of the WTO 
agreements prevail? This issue lies at the heart of 
the perceived conflict between trade liberalization 
and environmental protection. Some [such as envi­
ronmentalists] have suggested that the WTO 
should stand back from biotechnology and leave 
such decisions to multilateral environmental agree­
ments [MEAs] like the Protocol. But since biotech­
nology has been increasingly linked to trade, it is 
likely that in the event of a dispute, major 
exporters would favor the WTO rules.
It is also a legally complicated issue. According to 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Article 30), the requirement is that a later agree­
ment would prevail when two successive agree­
ments relating to the same subject matter are 
incompatible. The same Convention stipulates that 
when the later treaty includes only some of the 
parties to the earlier treaty, the later treaty prevails 
only with respect to those who are parties to both 
agreements. Otherwise the earlier treaty applies.7 
For parties to both agreements, the presumption 
that the later agreement prevail over an earlier one 
can be overcome if the later explicitly states that it 
"is not to be considered as incompatible with an 
earlier agreement" (as stated in Article 30 of
7 According to this explanation, since the United States 
is not a party to the Biodiversity Convention or the 
Protocol, earlier agreements (that is, the W T O  
agreements] would prevail should an LMO-related trade 
dispute arise between the United States and other 
countries.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). When 
an agreement contains such a statement, the terms 
of the earlier agreement prevail over incompatible 
terms of a later agreement. Such a statement is 
commonly referred to as a savings clause because, 
in effect, it saves provisions of the earlier agree­
ment from being overcome by incompatible terms 
in a later agreement.
Whether or not to include a "savings clause" is one 
of the most debated issues in the negotiations of 
the Protocol. Major agricultural exporters like the 
United States strongly support the inclusion of this 
clause. They fear that without such a clause, coun­
tries might make arbitrary decisions restricting 
their import of LMOs without scientific evidence 
by simply referring to the Protocol and arguing in 
the vague name of "precaution," or they might 
favor domestic LMO production over imports or 
favor LMO imports from some countries over 
others through their unilateral, bilateral, or regional 
trade arrangements. Given the uneven development 
of biotechnology across nations, it would not be 
surprising for some countries to use unfettered 
bans on the import of LMOs to allow their nascent 
domestic biotechnology industries to catch up with 
industry leaders and at the same time protect their 
nonbiotechnology industries from competition with 
biotechnology ones. A savings clause in the Proto­
col would render these acts subject to WTO 
disciplines.
The EU strongly objected to including a savings 
clause in the Protocol. Ostensibly, they argue that 
the provisions in the Protocol are not expected to 
modify other agreements and thus need not 
expressly so state. The real reason for the EU's 
rejection of the saving clause, however, is that, in 
the face of a new technology and novel products 
derived from it, they want the Protocol to give 
them enough flexibility to protect environment and 
human health without facing challenges from the 
WTO disciplines. The EU's position on the savings 
clause grew even stronger following its loss in the 
WTO beef hormone case against Canada and the 
United States.8 As recent food scandals have deeply 
shaken consume trust in food safety in the region, 
the EU needed stronger precautionary language in
8 The hormone case related to an EU ban on bovine 
meat and meat products from cattle treated with growth 
hormones. Complainants were Canada (WT/DS48) and 
the United States (WT/DS26).
the Protocol so that they could tighten domestic 
regulations to pacify its suspicious and sometimes 
angry public.
The Scope of the Protocol
Besides its relationship with the WTO rules, there 
are also controversies over the Protocol itself. One 
contentious issue is what kind of LMOs the Proto­
col should cover. Given the ever-increasing variety 
and production of GM products and their growing 
importance in international trade, the product 
scope of the Protocol is crucial for identifying the 
portions of trade that will be regulated. Some 
countries demanded strong notification procedures 
giving importing countries extensive rights to 
refuse the import of a full range of GM products, 
including GM commodities and products derived 
from them. Other countries were concerned that 
including all GM products within the purview of 
the Protocol would render international trade in 
agricultural commodities unworkable. They argued 
that lengthy approval procedures [like the AIA 
procedure] are not justified for commodities, which 
are not intended to be released into the environ­
ment and hence would not affect the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity.
Another issue is related to whether and how LMOs 
should be documented. The Protocol does not 
address domestic food-labeling requirements for 
consumer information but does establish standards 
for documentation accompanying LMOs that are 
moving across international borders. Whether the 
documentation provisions should apply to all 
LMOs or a portion of them has been actively 
debated. Because clear identification of each ship­
ment is a key element for the traceability of GMOs 
and for the feasibility of domestic labeling regimes, 
the EU insisted on such requirements for all 
LMOs. The United States, however, objected to 
specific identification requirements for all LMOs 
because doing so requires identity preservation all 
along the supply chain, which will significantly 
increase costs. In addition, labeling would have an 
adverse impact on consumer choice because con­
sumers would perceive the labeling as an indication 
that GM foods pose potential health and environ­
mental risks [Runge and Jackson 2000],
Human health and economic issues are also debated 
in the negotiation of the Protocol. Specifically, 
these questions include whether and how the
Protocol should take into account human health in 
addition to the environmental impact of LMOs; 
whether and how import bans or other restrictions 
should be based on socioeconomic considerations 
in addition to environmental ones; and whether and 
how the Protocol can create a liability and redress 
mechanism for any economic loss resulting from 
the transboundary movements of LMOs. The ques­
tion of "whether" had more or less been settled by 
the time of the Montreal meeting: most countries 
were in favor of the inclusion of provisions on 
human health and economic issues because they 
believe that if these provisions were eventually 
exercised, then by definition there must have been 
a need for them and if they were never exercised, 
there would have been no harm in including them. 
The questions of "how" were largely unsolved even 
after the adoption of the Protocol.
Stakeholders
The Miami Group
The "Miami Group" represents some major 
exporters of GM seed and crops and countries 
with the world's most advanced biotechnology 
industries.9 The group was led by the United States 
and also included Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, and Uruguay. It is the group's common 
interest to seek free trade in GM products and to 
preclude the use of environmental protection as a 
disguised trade barrier. In the negotiation of the 
Protocol, the Miami Group insisted that 1] LMO- 
FFPs be kept outside the scope of the Protocol's 
AIA procedure; 2] a "savings clause" be included in 
the Protocol; 3] decisions on trade measures be 
based on risk assessments and "sound science"; and 
4] the use of the precautionary principle and 
socioeconomic considerations in decision making 
be limited. Because the EU had resorted to the pre­
cautionary principle in defending the beef hormone 
case and in blocking Canadian and U.S. requests for 
regulatory approvals of certain LMOs, the Miami 
Group was suspicious about whether the EU would 
use the Protocol to further justify its WTO-incon- 
sistent trade measures.
9 The description of stakeholders in this section is based 
on Cosbey and Burgiel (2000].
The Like-Minded Group and the EU
The "Like-Minded Group" is a developing country 
negotiating coalition [excluding the three develop­
ing countries in the Miami Group], Countries in 
this group range from those with no domestic 
regulatory structures, legislation, or biotechnology 
industries to those with fairly developed systems. 
The Like-Mined Group generally perceived them­
selves as importers rather than exporters of GM 
products, and thus, they supported a strong Proto­
col, in light of the unknown effects of LMOs on 
the environment and human health as a result of 
their inadequate regulatory or institutional capacity. 
During the negation, the Like-Minded Group called 
for the Protocol to 1] cover a comprehensive scope 
of organisms, including LMO-FFPs; 2] take into 
account human health and socioeconomic consider 
ations; 3] require comprehensive identification and 
documentation; and 4] include a strong statement 
of the precautionary principle and a concrete text 
on liability and redress.
Countries in the EU negotiated as a common bloc 
because of their shared interests. Similar to the 
Like-Mined Group, the EU also demanded a strong 
Protocol. As most of the EU countries had had 
well-established food safety regulatory systems 
prior to the adoption of the Protocol, the pressure 
for a more protective international law came pri­
marily from the concerned public as a result of 
recent food safety crises. Specifically, the EU had 
pushed for 1] inclusion of LMO-FFPs but with 
possible special treatment; 2] identification and 
documentation for all LMOs; 3] exclusion of a 
savings clause;10 and 4] strong language on the 
precautionary principle.
The Compromise Group and Central and 
Eastern European (CEE') Group
The Compromise Group [Japan, Mexico, Norway, 
Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and, at the 
Montreal meeting, New Zealand] and CEE Group 
emerged during the final days of the Cartagena 
negotiations with the specific intent to bridge the 
major gaps between the other negotiating groups 
by developing compromise positions and alternative 
formulations. These two groups represented the
10 The EU instead supported the inclusion of a 
nondiscrimination provision, stating that countries would 
not discriminate among domestically produced LM Os 
and those being imported.
interests of a diverse set of countries and provided 
additional impetus for addressing the range of con­
cerns of both developed and developing countries.
Policy Options
Reconciliation —A Savings Clause
To resolve its potential conflicts with the WTO 
provisions, the Preamble of the Protocol provides a 
sort of "savings clause," which reads as follows:
Recognizing that trade and environment 
agreements should be mutually supportive 
with a view to achieving sustainable devel­
opment,
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be 
interpreted as implying a change in the 
rights and obligations of a Party under any 
existing international agreements,
Understanding that the above recital is not 
intended to subordinate this Protocol to 
other international agreements,. . .
This language, which was adapted from the Pream­
ble to the 1998 Rotterdam Convention, does not 
express an explicit rule for determining which 
agreement or agreements to use in case of disputes. 
In particular, the ambiguity leaves unclear its rela­
tionship with the WTO agreements. Some find that 
the Preamble, in effect, contains no savings clause 
because it "is not intended to subordinate this Pro­
tocol to other international agreements." There­
fore, should disputes on trade in LMOs arise, the 
Protocol would be the applicable law, not the WTO 
agreements.
Others argue that the Preamble effectively 
preserved parties' rights and obligations under 
other agreements since the Protocol "should not 
be interpreted as implying a change in the rights 
and obligations of a Party under any existing inter­
national agreements." Under this view, rules of the 
WTO or other customary international law, envi­
ronmental and human rights conventions, or 
regional and bilateral agreements to which disput­
ing parties are bound could all be invoked.
This issue is further complicated by the fact that 
major GMO producers and exporters such as the 
United States are still nonparties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity and to the Protocol. In this 
situation, the WTO agreements would more likely 
be the law applicable in WTO dispute resolution, 
because if the WTO panel or the Appellate Body 
base their judgment on a non-WTO provision 
(such as the Protocol), the defendant may decline 
jurisdiction by arguing that such a provision does 
not apply to non-parties. The recent U.S.-EU GMO 
dispute settlement is a case in point.
To better avoid possible conflicts, WTO legal 
documents need to develop ways of referring to 
the Protocol, to open a door toward "cross-fertili­
zation of international law" and "co-operative fact­
finding" (Eggers and Mackenzie 2000, 541). In 
practice, a WTO panel should seek various ways to 
combine the use of WTO rules with that of the 
provisions in the Protocol. For example, in a GMO 
dispute on a precautionary measure, the WTO 
panel, when interpreting the precautionary 
language of the Protocol, could require the party 
of import to implement restrictive trade measures 
"provisionally" by referring to Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement. In addition, the panel could take 
account of the "fact-finding" under the Protocol 
when determining whether scientific evidence is 
insufficient or whether a provisional measure is 
based on available pertinent information, as 
required by the SPS Agreement."
Precautionary Action
The Protocol reserves the right of the parties to 
make decisions on imports on the basis of the pre­
cautionary principle in relation to both LMOs to 
be introduced into the environment and LMO- 
FFPs. It states that lack of scientific certainty due to 
insufficient relevant scientific information and 
knowledge regarding the extent of potential 
adverse effects of an LMO shall not prevent a 
party of import from making a decision with 
regard to the import of that LMO in order to 
avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
Although the Protocol endorses the right of 
parties to make a precautionary decision to avoid
1 A s  shown earlier, the Protocol does not require a trade 
restriction to be adopted "provisionally" as required by 
the SPS Agreement. However, the Protocol requires the 
exporting country to provide scientific evidence and to 
carry out risk assessment. Annex III of the Protocol 
contains more specific definitions and guidelines on risk 
assessment than the SPS Agreement.
or minimize the potential adverse effects of LMOs 
on biodiversity, countries should refrain from 
abusing it to the extent that normal trade is 
unnecessarily restricted. The most appropriate pre­
cautionary action should be a function of the level 
of identified harm, the extent of uncertainty, and 
the availability of alternative technologies, as well as 
the agricultural, social, environmental, and eco­
nomic goals of individual parties. Possible forms of 
precautionary action range from bans on new 
LMOs to phasing out of existing LMOs, moratoria 
on future development and commercialization, and 
conditional approvals with monitoring.
Different Treatments
Although the Protocol prima facie covers all LMOs 
that may have adverse effects on the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, it pro­
vides different procedures in dealing with different 
types of LMOs. The AIA procedure is confined to 
LMOs for intentional introduction into the envi­
ronment of the party of import. It does not apply 
to LMO-FFPs. For example, if seeds of GM maize 
are exported for the purpose of field trials, the 
party of import needs to be notified with sufficient 
information by the exporter and the shipment 
should be approved in advance as required by the 
AIA. However, if the GM maize is intended for 
use as food and animal feed, the exporter would 
not need to obey the strict notification require­
ments established by the AIA.
For the LMO-FFPs, which make up the bulk of 
trade in GM products, a more simplified procedure 
is necessary. As outlined in Article 11, exporters are 
obliged only to provide documentation indicating 
that the shipment "may contain LMOs" and is not 
intended for intentional introduction into the envi­
ronment. This simple documentation requirement 
would render trade in GMOs more operational, 
but add little to the traceability of GMOs and the 
feasibility of domestic labeling.
Human Health and Socioeconomic 
Considerations
In addition to the environmental impacts of LMOs, 
the Protocol was able to take into account human 
health risks, which were confined to those origi­
nating from biodiversity impacts and direct contact 
(allergenic reactions), rather than risks on food 
safety grounds, which are expected to be addressed
in the SPS Agreement. Article 26 allows parties to 
take socioeconomic considerations into account 
when reaching a decision on whether to import an 
LMO, but only insofar as they arise from the 
impact of LMOs on the conservation and sustaina­
ble use of biodiversity and the value of biodiversity 
to indigenous and local communities. Additionally, 
when taking such socioeconomic considerations 
into account, a party must act consistently with its 
other international obligations [Article 26],
The set of human health and socioeconomic con­
siderations is of limited scope and represents a 
compromise between parties in the decision making 
on LMO imports. The considerations as stated in 
the Protocol are only confined to those related to 
direct impacts or losses. In reality, however, 
indirect impacts and losses may be more significant. 
Given the newness and scientific uncertainty of 
biotechnology and the fact that the population, 
economy and the environment in poor developing 
countries are vulnerable to adverse LMO impacts, a 
more broadly defined human health and socio­
economic considerations would benefit them 
better.
Liability and Redress
It is important to include a liability and redress 
provision in the Protocol so that parties of export 
can be held accountable when LMOs cause 
damages to the parties of import. Despite the 
importance of the issue, its treatment in the Proto­
col was postponed. An enabling clause in Article 27 
of the Protocol states that "the Conference of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall, at their first meeting, 
adopt a process with respect to the appropriate 
elaboration of international rules and procedures in 
the field of liability and redress for damage result­
ing from transboundary movements of LMOs" and 
"shall endeavor to complete this process within 
four years." Accordingly, the first meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to the Protocol [COP-MOP] held in 
2004 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, established an 
Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and 
Technical Experts on Liability and Redress to fulfill 
the mandate under Article 27.
Major tasks undertaken by the working group to 
date include reviewing the information relating to 
liability and redress for damage resulting from 
transboundary movements of LMOs; analyzing
general issues relating to the potential or actual 
damage scenarios and the application of inter­
national rules and procedures on liability and 
redress to the damage scenarios; and elaborating 
options for elements of rules and procedures on 
liability and redress, including definition and nature 
of damage, valuation of damage to biodiversity and 
to human health, threshold of damage, causation, 
channeling of liability, roles of parties of import 
and export, standard of liability, mechanisms of 
financial security, and right to bring claims. The 
working group is scheduled to report on its activi­
ties to the COP-MOP and complete its work in 
2007.
Assignment
Your assignment is to recommend changes in 
either the Protocol or the WTO agreements that 
would mitigate the conflicts between GM com­
modity trade and environmental protection, taking 
into account the positions of the key stakeholder 
groups.
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